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Similar mechanisms in ventral caudate 
seem to implement “fictive error” signals, 
which compare actual outcomes against 
“things that could have been,” thus allowing 
organisms to update their expectations in 
light of imagined feedback (Lohrenz et al., 
2007). Finally, evaluative mechanisms in 
orbitofrontal cortex represent reward values 
– in concert with mechanisms in the basal 
ganglia – in a way that seems to facilitate 
making choices on the basis of the prob-
ability of a positive outcome, given recent 
patterns of gains and losses (Frank and 
Claus, 2006). Together, these types of evalu-
ative mechanisms appear to implement the 
learning signals and motivational “umph” 
required to get Pavlovian, habitual, and goal-
directed learning off the ground (Rangel 
et al., 2008; Liljeholm and O’Doherty, 2012).
I contend that we also need evalua-
tive processes to understand how cultural 
practices “stack the dice so that we can 
more easily minimize costly prediction-
errors” (Clark, in press, p. 43). Evaluative 
mechanisms can facilitate cultural attune-
ment by treating norm compliance as 
rewarding and norm violation as aversive 
(Montague, 2006). And, perceived devia-
tions from social norms appear to evoke 
neural responses that are similar to predic-
tion-error signals (Klucharev et al., 2009, 
2011). But, why would these prediction-
error signals ever lead us to revise social 
institutions and social practices, as opposed 
to leading us to recalibrate our judgments? 
A purely calibrational mechanism can 
make sense of the conservative aspects of 
habitual learning and cultural attunement, 
but they leave the (relatively rare) cases 
where people attempt to reconfigure their 
environments in ways that better suit their 
interests mysterious.
We need an account of valuational 
mechanisms to understand these practices 
of social niche construction. The decision 
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Clark (in press) argues that perception and 
action depend on “hierarchical predictive 
coding” systems, which attempt to reduce 
surprisal (a measure of the implausibility 
of a state given a model of the world). But, 
his appeal to surprisal-reduction does not 
explain the motivation to seek change, initi-
ate motion, or engage in exploration. As he 
notes, “staying still inside a darkened room 
would afford easy and nigh-perfect predic-
tion of our own neural states” (Clark, in 
press, p. 37). Clark claims that inborn expec-
tations yield instinctual and tropistic behav-
ior; and, he is right that surprisal-reduction 
mechanisms could modify behavior and 
reduce discrepancies between outcomes and 
these expectations. But, biological organ-
isms must also recognize that strategies can 
be better and worse; and, they must be able 
to update their goals when the value of a 
reward changes (e.g., as they become sated or 
hungry). Even on the assumption that corti-
cal processing aims to minimize prediction-
errors, processes like learning, motivation, 
and decision-making also require valuation.
The location and stability of food and 
water are often uncertain. So, intelligent 
foraging requires evaluative strategies that 
can determine which practices are likely to 
yield the best payoffs relative to the costs of 
acting (Montague et al., 2012). Savvy organ-
isms should act when the benefits are likely 
to outweigh the costs of seeking change 
and engaging in exploration (Montague 
and King-Casas, 2007). But, this situation is 
complicated by the fact that dangerous and 
unforeseen situations often require making 
rapid decisions that are sensitive to the cost of 
acting as well as the value of the payoff that can 
be expected in pursuing a reward. This is why 
savvy organisms must possess mechanisms 
that facilitate reward-seeking where payoffs 
are better than previously experienced. But, 
this requires treating outcomes and strategies 
as better and worse, which requires more than 
just minimizing prediction-errors.
Although there is debate over the pre-
cise mechanisms responsible for valuation, 
a broad consensus has emerged that one 
core mechanism is implemented by a net-
work of midbrain dopaminergic neurons 
that compute prediction-error signals for 
expected rewards. This network computes a 
bi-directional teaching signal, which moni-
tors the extent to which outcomes are bet-
ter or worse-than-expected. Spiking rates in 
the basal ganglia, for example, increase when 
rewards are better-than-expected, decrease 
when they are worse-than-expected, and are 
unaffected when the time and quantity of 
rewards is accurately predicted (Montague 
et al., 1996). These evaluative error signals 
are computed for primary rewards; and, 
they can be attuned to respond to almost 
any reward-predicting stimuli –  suggesting 
that they compute a polysensory and multi-
modal signal that can direct attention, learn-
ing, and action-selection in light of various 
valuable outcomes (Schultz, 1998, 2010). 
Curiously, these mechanisms also respond 
to novel events independently of their value; 
but, there is reason to suppose that this is 
because dopaminergic signals motivate 
exploration by treating novelty as its own 
reward (Liljeholm and O’Doherty, 2012).
Similar evaluative mechanisms seem to 
be found throughout the brain. For exam-
ple, mechanisms in the ventral striatum 
compute expectations when the distribution 
and likelihood of a reward is uncertain; and 
there are distinct circuits in the ventral stria-
tum and anterior insula that evaluate risk 
and compute risk- prediction-error signals 
(Preuschoff et al., 2006, 2008; Quartz, 2009). 
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to change your environment is always 
risky. And, risky decisions require not only 
the ability to predict rewards, but also to 
evaluate the likelihood of success and the 
value of achieving your goals. It may be 
possible to get genuine norm compliance 
from a system that doesn’t represent value 
– though I am skeptical. But, deciding to 
reject a norm, to challenge a social institu-
tion, or to develop better practices requires 
evaluating the likely outcomes as better 
and worse. Surprisal-reduction mecha-
nisms cannot represent things as better 
and worse, they can only represent and 
reduce deviations from our expectations. 
However, constructing a world that stacks 
the dice in our favor sometimes requires 
pursuing a world that is better than the 
one we expect.
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